Additive manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D printing is increasingly used to manufacture functional parts of safety-critical systems. The AM's dependence on computerization raises the concern that the AM process can be tampered with, and a part's mechanical properties sabotaged. To address this threat, we propose a novel approach for detecting sabotage attacks based on trusted monitoring of the current delivered to each printer motor. The proposed approach offers numerous advantages: 1) it is non-invasive in a time-critical process, 2) it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and 3) it can be air-gapped from the computerized components of the AM process, making simultaneous compromise more difficult. We evaluated the approach on five categories of toolpath command-level manipulations that impact the geometry of the 3D printed object. Our evaluation showed that all but one tested category of attacks can be reliably detected, even if a single toolpath command is modified.
I. INTRODUCTION
Additive Manufacturing technology (AM), a.k.a. 3D Printing, is receiving immense attention due to the potential for improvements in product performance, decreased development times, and reduced costs. Traditional, ''subtractive'' manufacturing methods, in which material is removed from a part via machining or the use of pre-fabricated dies, necessitate substantial investments in capital equipment, longer lead times, and higher labor costs. AM allows for manufacturing with minimal material waste, shorter design-to-product times, and economical, on-demand production of low volume parts.
These advantages apply to a broad range of applications, from models and prototypes up to functional parts of safety-critical systems. An example of the latter is the FAA-approved fuel injection nozzle for General Electric's LEAP jet engine [1] . Further examples of components produced using AM techniques include medical implants [2] , [3] , air ducts [4] , and tooling [5] .
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According to the Wohlers Report [6] , a renowned annual survey of advances in AM, the 2018 AM industry accounted for $6.063 billion of revenue, with 33.8% of all AM-manufactured objects used as functional parts. 1 A study conducted by Ernst & Young [8] shows the rapidly growing adoption of this technology worldwide. In the U.S. alone, 16% of surveyed manufacturing companies have experience with AM and another 16% are considering adopting this technology in the future. The current world leader of AM adoption is Germany with 37% of surveyed companies already using and a further 12% considering AM.
AM's dependence on computerization prompted a growing concern that the AM process can be tampered with, in order to sabotage a part's mechanical, thermal, or other essential properties [9] .
While several studies have shown that a part's mechanical properties can be degraded when an adversary has a control over manufacturing equipment [10] - [12] , Belikovetsky et al.' s recent study [13] has proven experimentally that a complete sabotage attack is possible. To address this emerging security threat, we propose and evaluate a novel solution for detecting sabotage attacks in AM.
The proposed solution is based on monitoring the current supplied to individual actuators and the detection of anomalies in this data. The proposed approach has numerous advantages: (i) it is non-invasive in a time-critical process (ii) it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and (iii) it can be easily air-gapped from the computerized components involved in the AM process, increasing the difficulty of simultaneous compromise.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After discussing related work in Section II and describing an attack model in Section III, we present details of the proposed solution in Section IV. We experimentally evaluate the proposed solution in Section V. After discussing the applicability of the proposed solution to industrial-grade metal AM systems in Section VI, we conclude with a short review and an outline of planned future work.
II. RELATED WORK
By the end of 2017, around 70 publications had addressed various aspects of AM security [9] . For this paper, we focus on publications about sabotage attacks and their detection.
A. SABOTAGE ATTACKS
Several studies have discussed compromising AM equipment. Moore et al. [14] analyzed open source software that is commonly used with desktop 3D printers; the authors identified numerous vulnerabilities that could be exploited to compromise a device's software, firmware, and communication protocol. While limited in scope to consumer products, Moore's work demonstrated an approach and general profile for AM software analysis. Do et al. [15] exploited weaknesses in a network communication protocol employed by a desktop 3D printer, and were able to cancel current and submit new print jobs. Their work, much like Moore et al.'s, extended common vulnerabilities to consumer 3D printers. Belikovetsky et al. [13] used a classical phishing attack to obtain remote shell access to a compromised machine. The choice of a classical compromise means the work did not uncover anything specific to AM equipment, but the authors' execution of a full attack chain from intial compromise to attack delivery helped identify the real requirements and characteristics of an AM sabotage attack.
To date, the majority of works on sabotage attacks have been performed on desktop 3D printers employing fused deposition modeling (FDM) technology and operating on polymers. Sturm et al. [10] experimentally showed that voids introduced in .stl design file by malware can reduce a 3D-printed part's tensile strength. A similar result was demonstrated by Zeltmann et al. [12] , who instead used a contaminant material with a significantly different stiffness value. Both works conducted rigorous physical testing, with Sturm et al. using an ASTM (formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials, renamed to no longer be an acronym) standard test procedure. Zeltmann et al. further demonstrate the limitations of ultrasonic scanning in detecting their attack. Belikovetsky et al. [13] used defects to significantly speed up material fatigue development, causing a premature failure. This was also the first study to demonstrate a full chain of attack on/with AM, from the compromise of a benign manufacturing environment, through the development of a selective defect for a propeller design file, up to the crash of a quadcopter UAV incorporating a sabotaged propeller. Xiao [16] showed that malicious firmware can be used to modify the temperature of the extruded filament; Moore et al. [17] also used malicious firmware to modify the amount of extruded filament. Both studies show that their manipulations impact the part's geometry. Chen et al. [18] specifically integrated in a design file features that will degrade a part's mechanical properties if it is printed with the wrong parameters; the authors propose to use this approach to protect intellectual property. While creating intentionally faulty parts as a form of IP protection might have moral and legal issues, the notion of design and environmental parameter alignment as a lock and key is valuable.
For metal AM, Yampolskiy et al. [11] performed an analysis of what manufacturing parameters can degrade a part's mechanical properties. Among the identified parameters are build direction, scanning strategy, scanning speed, heat source energy, environmental conditions in build chamber, and others. Although not a security work per se, Ilie et al. [19] demonstrated that modifications of laser power and exposure time can be used to create predictable failure points, and any practical exploration of metal AM parameters is valuable to security research. Pope and Yampolskiy [20] identified that network communication timing as well as manipulations of supplied power can be used to sabotage a manufactured part. Slaughter et al. [21] has shown that a compromised in situ quality control system can be used to sabotage the quality of the manufactured part; the authors show this on a SLM machine employing IR thermography. Yampolskiy et al. [22] proposed a framework for analyzing attacks on or with AM. The authors argue that, especially for metal AM, sabotage attacks can target the mechanical properties of a manufactured part, the AM machine itself, and the environment of either a sabotaged part or a 3D printer.
B. SABOTAGE ATTACKS DETECTION
Several methods have been proposed to detect sabotage attacks. To date, only defensive methods for FDM machines have been verified.
Chhetri et al. [23] distinguished between the sound produced by a desktop FDM 3D printer's motors when operating in different speeds and directions. The authors used this to detect deviations in the printed object's geometry, achieving a 77.45% precision in deviation detection. Belikovetsky et al. [24] also used acoustic emanations to detect deviations in a manufacturing process. The authors applied principal component analysis (PCA) to generate an acoustic signature of a benign 3D printing process; the validity of follow-up printing processes can be verified by comparing the acoustic signatures. They further introduce the notion of atomic modifications as the minimal possible change introduced to a design. Belikovetsky et al. identified detection thresholds for atomic attacks on G-code: insertion, deletion, reordering of a single command, as well as modification of a command's parameters. Bayens et al. [25] combined acoustic and inertia sensors to detect changes in a 3D printed part's infill pattern. The authors also used Raman spectroscopy to validate the source material, which Yampolskiy et al. [11] proposed could be contaminated or substituted. The author's work in synthesizing different side channels opens interesting practical and theoretical areas of research, particularly in discovering what combinations provide more complete information.
Albakri et al. [26] and Sturm et al. [27] applied impedance based Structural Health Monitoring (SHM), an approach that has shown good results in other areas. The authors show that it is possible to identify changes in internal geometry as well as in a part's mass, but were unable to detect changes in internal porosity, an important category of attack.
Tsoutsos et al. [28] proposed a two stage approach. First, the authors reconstruct a 3D printed object model based on the G-code commands sent to the 3D printer. Then, they simulate the mechanical properties of the reconstructed object using a finite element analysis (FEA) tool. The results of the simulations indicate points of stress concentration, enabling an operator to identify sabotage. An admitted limitation of this approach is an inability to prevent attacks executed by malicious firmware.
III. THREAT MODEL
3D printed objects generally begin as digital 3D models, stored on a computer. The most common file format remains .STL, with emerging file formats like .AMF or .3MF offering better accuracy and additional features like color. For a 3D printing job, the 3D model is first ''sliced'' by dedicated software (like Slic3r) into layers; for each layer a toolpath is generated that defines exactly what actuators (motors and similar 3D printer components) should act and in what sequence. Afterwards, the PC communicates to the 3D printer either the whole toolpath or individual commands (for desktop 3D printers, usually in G-code). Most 3D printers are capable of either TCP/IP or USB communication, although some inexpensive models require the loading of flash memory cards. The commands are then interpreted and executed by the firmware installed on the 3D Printer. If a command requests motion from an analog actuator, the firmware ''translates'' it to the actuator's input power supply characteristics, such as frequency and voltage. The actuator may be driven by the printer's main board, if it is capable of generating the correct signal, but commonly a separate motor controller is used.
For sabotage attacks, researchers have compromised various elements of the outlined 3D printing workflow. Moore et al., 2016 identified numerous vulnerabilities in software, firmware, and communication protocols often employed in desktop 3D printing niche. Belikovetsky et al. [13] used a phishing attack to enable remote access to the controller PC. Sturm et al. [10] used malware running on the controller PC to automatically modify STL files. Do et al. [15] exploited weaknesses in the communication protocol between the controller PC and a 3D printer and were able to cancel a print or submit a new job. Moore et al., 2017 [17] presented a wide range of attacks possible through 3D Printer firmware compromise.
We consider the following threat model:
• As a lesson learned from the demonstrated attacks, we assume that any computerized element in the AM workflow (controller PC, 3D printer, computer network) can be compromised.
• Analog actuators (e.g., stepper motors) cannot be directly compromised via cyber means. We assume that actuators behaving according to characteristics of analog input (such as Variable Frequency Drives, VFD) are not compromised.
• Destructive testing 2 can provide high-confidence data about the mechanical characteristics of a manufactured 3D object. This information will be used to validate that the 3D printing process has not been tampered with. This approach is similar to the one used by Agrawal et al. [29] for detecting hardware Trojans using IC fingerprinting.
• Our detection system (which includes induction probes, oscilloscope, and a monitoring PC for data analysis) is air-gapped from the manufacturing environment and is not compromised. Results from destructive testing can be used to (manually) confirm the benign nature of a manufacturing process, and thus validate the signature generated by the process.
• Electrical connections (of power monitoring system and of 3D Printing environment) are not physically tampered with, so that they are identical during both unaltered and maliciously modified manufacturing.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we first outline the fundamental concept of the proposed solution. Then we present how a power consumption signature can be generated and compared, so that it can be used to verify the unaltered nature of the monitored AM process.
A. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT
While a 3D object model can have various representations, ranging from STL files to individual toolpath commands, these commands are eventually translated into electrical signals and/or power supply to the actuators. In the case of Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM), the actuators are four motors that control the print head's X/Y/Z movement and filament extrusion. In addition, a 3D printer typically has actuators heating the extruded filament and the print bed, as well as running the print head fan.
In this study, we consider four stepper motors. Figure 1 presents the current delivered during a 3D printing process; it contains traces captured from (top to bottom) the X, Y, Z, and Extruder stepper motors. All these actuators are directly driven; the movement of a stepper motor is determined by the supplied current. A DC supply (if low-amplitude noise is ignored) indicates the controlled motor is stationary. When sinusoidal current is applied to a stepper motor, each oscillation induces a magnetic field in a set of the motor's internal coils. This magnetic field draws the geared iron rotor forward by one step. Its rotational speed is controlled by the oscillation frequency. The drive direction can be changed by reversing the current through a set of coils.
This allows us to make several observations. First, modifying a design (in any of its representations) will produce corresponding changes in the current used to drive the actuators. This also means that deviations can be detected by comparison between the current traces of a monitored manufacturing process and the traces of a verified benign one. This is illustrated in Figure 2 , showing the original (top) and an altered (bottom) current trace of the X motor captured during an experiment.
However, while visual comparison provides an intuitive way to illustrate our idea, it is not practical when considering traces that are hundreds or thousands of times longer than the given example. To enable an automated comparison, we built upon an approach proposed by Belikovetsky et al. [24] for acoustic side-channel emanations. We also introduce several significant modifications to this approach. First, our data capture methodology separates the signals from each motor. We can therefore apply the approach to each motor individually, rather than to the combined signal as in the original work. Second, while the original approach detects integrity violation for an entire 3D print, in this work we perform discrete detection for each printed layer. A further extension of the current proposal includes the identification of layers that have been added, deleted, or modified.
To distinguish between layers and layer transitions, we exploit the following observation: the Z motor does not move while a layer is being printed (represented by primarily DC current in the power trace) and moves when the layer is changed (represented by the high-amplitude oscillations in the power traces). This can be used to identify time-intervals for both layers and layer transitions.
It is necessary to compare printer behavior during the layer transitions. As Figure 1 illustrates, both the X and Y motors are active during this phase to ensure correct X/Y positioning at the beginning of the next layer. Therefore, monitoring is needed to detect attempts to modify this initial position. Further, the layer transition time can be used for a burst of increased/reduced filament extrusion (an attack similar to the one presented by Moore et al. [17] ). Such sabotage attempts should also be detected during this time. Figure 3 outlines the approach that we use to create a master power consumption signature, i.e., the signature of a verifiable unaltered object. An object model (commonly defined in .STL, .AMF, or .3MF file format) is used to 3D print a part (in the figure, a propeller). As discussed in Section III, our threat model assumes that this file, a computer that stores this file and controls the 3D printer, the communication network between this computer and the 3D printer, and the 3D printer itself can each be compromised and used to sabotage a printed part. We propose to validate the benign nature of the 3D printed part, i.e., its compliance to the required mechanical properties, by using destructive methods. This approach was inspired by the proposal of Agrawal et al. [29] for detecting hardware Trojans.
B. MASTER SIGNATURE GENERATION
As manufacturing and testing equipment can be (and often are) air-gapped, their simultaneous compromise is unlikely though not impossible; this supports the validity of our assumption.
During the 3D printing process, we monitor and capture current traces using non-invasive inductive measurements. One trace is captured for each individual actuator. We treat each of the traces as a channel of information. Traces from each individual channel are time-synchronized.
We then use Z channel activity to identify transitions between layers (indicated in Figure 3 by two vertical dotted lines). The result of this operation is a list of {t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t n }, where t 0 and t n are absolute times of traces beginning and end. The values t 1 through t n−1 are times of layer transitions, i.e, the times when the Z axis changes states between moving and being steady, or vice versa. As we trigger the trace recording right before the very first toolpath command is sent, t 0 will be always 0. After the 3D printing is finished, the printer raises the head and ceases moving. The time of this event will be captured by t n−1 . Therefore, we can set t n to the minimal duration of all channels. We identify t 1 through t n−1 as shown in Algorithm 1. for each frame in frames do 7: fft_frame = FFT (frame) 8: max_bin = Max_position(ABS(fft_frame)) 9: finger_print_value = max_bin wnd_size * resampleRate 10: finger_print.append(finger_print_value) 11: end for return finger_print 12: end function
Algorithm 1 Power-Trace Fingerprint
The power supply information captured for all individual channels is used in the signature generation. Algorithm 1 gives pseudo code for the algorithm we use to generate the fingerprint.
Lines 2 and 3: The captured signals contain the majority of their information at frequencies of 200Hz and below. We have therefore downsampled the signal to 400Hz without losing critical data. Line 5: The signal is segmented into overlapping frames of a given size (wnd_size) with the given step interval (wnd_step). Lines 6 to 11: For each segmented frame in the re-sampled power trace signal we estimate the dominant frequency of the drive signal. Line 7 We calculate the frame spectrum using a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) implementation as in [30] . Line 8: We identify the bin with the maximum power as the dominant frequency of the frame. Line 9: We convert the bin value into the proper frequency value.
Line 10: Lastly, the frequency value is appended to the signature. Line 11: The return value is a sequence of motor frequencies per each frame. First, we calculate the fingerprint signature for each channel individually, using predefined window sizes and steps. In our case, we have used the window size of 32 samples and the stepping measure of 16 samples. Then, for each channel, we segment the fingerprint with layer information from the Z-axis. The information of the Z-axis fingerprint is analyzed and transformed into boolean values indicating whether the motor is moving. This is done by using a threshold value. If the sample of Z-axis at a specific point larger than the threshold then the motor is moving, otherwise it is at rest. Please note that for Z axis we don't distinguish between possible variations of motor speed; our tests have shown that this distinction is difficult because of a very short transition time along this axis. Thus, segmenting the fingerprint corresponding with the time-interval [t i , t i+1 ]. Generalizing for m monitored channels, the resulting fingerprints of the whole trace can be described as a matrix of fingerprints for each individual channel and for each individual power consumption signature time interval PCS t i j . The resulting master signature is a matrix of power consumption signatures for all channels/time-intervals
. . . PCS t n m   As indicated above, the power consumption-based master signature is only accepted if the quality of a 3D printed object was successfully verified. At this point, the master signature can be saved for use in the verification algorithm.
C. TESTED SIGNATURE GENERATION & VERIFICATION
To verify that the 3D printing process of a part was not altered (and thus that the part was not sabotaged), we compare a master signature with the signature generated from the current traces of the investigated process. Figure 4 summarizes the verification process.
For the verification process, the current delivered during the printing process is measured using a non-invasive induction method. The signal of each axis is then processed using the Power-Trace Fingerprint generation Algorithm 1. The post-processed Z-axis fingerprint consists of 0s (for the time frames when z motor is not moving and a 3D part's layer is printed) and 1s (for the time frames when z motor is moving to scent to the next layer). The transitions between 0 and 1 (or vice versa) determine the times t i s. Both diverging amounts of printed layers and layer durations can be used as an early indicator of a sabotage attack.
We then construct a new time series that represents the changes in the Z-axis. The result is a list {t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t n } where each t i is the beginning of a layer or the transition between layers. Then, generated signatures of the other channels are split into layer corresponding to the list of t i s. The generated signature is a m × q matrix, where m is the number of channels and q is the number of time-frames identified for the tested power traces. The matrix elements PCS t j i are tested signatures for each channel/time-interval in the tested power traces.
Before we can describe how master and tested signatures are compared, we have to make several additional remarks. First, even an unaltered 3D printing process can introduce slight deviation in the duration of identified time-frames. This can be caused by factors like the stochastic nature of the physical 3D printing process, environmental influences, or measurement errors. To accommodate for this possibility, we introduce a threshold T threshold under which we consider traces for two time-frames, one from master and another one from tested signature, as approximately the same length.
Second, the monitored actuators perform differently. For instance, the speed of a motor controlling filament extrusion is significantly lower than of X/Y/Z motors. The axis motors also each have different drive characteristics, to a lesser degree. As such, a different degree of similarity should be acceptable for different channels. To accommodate this, we introduce a similarity threshold vector ST = (ST 1 , . . . , ST m ) T ; through its elements ST i different similarity thresholds can be specified for each individual channel. Such thresholds do not necessarily have to be a single value, but can represent a complex condition.
Third, we also wish to distinguish between 3D printed layers that are either (a) identical, (b) have been deleted (c) have been inserted, or (d) have been modified (i..e., a combination of changes). This requires a similarity measure between two layers. The layer similarity can be defined based on the similarity of individual channels. In this work, we use a conservative approach, i.e., the dissimilarity even in a single channel is treated as the dissimilarity of the complete layer.
We calculate the similarity between two channel/timeintervals of master and tested signatures as follows:
, ST m ) This style of comparison would allow a technician to precisely locate and evaluate an anomaly. We consider the manufactured part as validated if all of the following conditions are fulfilled:
• Amount of layers (or tested time-intervals identified based on layer transitions) is identical for both master and tested signature, i.e., n = q.
• Deviations of layer duration for each compared layer are below a specified threshold T threshold , i.e., ∀ t i , i ∈ [1, n]: 3 Since even identical prints introduce a slight deviation in the values, the division of Z-axis into layers is not precise and might introduce discrepancies between layer times and durations of master and of tested signatures. Therefore, in order to compare between two individual layers we run the layer-comparison algorithm several times, each time using a different offset for the beginning of the comparison.
Algorithm 2 describes a comparison between the layers using a specific offset, and as such implements the above mentioned function IsSimilar. Each value of the two layers is compared and the mismatching values are counted. If the total number of mismatching values is below a specified threshold, the layers are considered identical. Otherwise, the comparison is done again with a different offset.
V. Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we first present our experimental setup and describe the experiments performed. We then present and analyze our results. Figure 5 presents our experimental setup. A desktop PC using the Repetier-Host software controlled the print jobs. In the experimental evaluation of the proposed approach traces were captured from a Printrbot Plus 1404 3D printer. This is a desktop 3D printer employing Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM) technology, an AM process commonly used in 3D printing with polymers. For the movements along X, Y, and Z axis as well as for the filament extrusion, this 3D printer utilizes Nema 17 stepper motors, rated for 4.2V and 1.5 A per phase.
There are several well-established means of measuring power supply (for a short overview see, e.g., an online article by Ramsden [31] ). We opted in for a out-of-band inductive current measurement. Specifically, we use a high value Tektronix A622 AC/DC current probe that uses a Hall effect current sensor to provide voltage output to an oscilloscope.
This approach has numerous advantages. Most importantly, for the conducted experiments, it allows us to measure supplied electrical power without any modifications to the 3D printer. 4 In a manufacturing environment, this would have the advantages of non-intrusiveness in a time-critical AM process as well as the ability to retrofit legacy systems. Further, it does not alter the signal, specifically it neither reduces the delivered current nor introduces phase shifts. Therefore, it has no impact on the functionality of the 3D printer.
In order to reconstruct the original signal without errors, the sample rate of the trace must be above the Nyquist rate, i.e., at least double the rate of the highest non-noise frequency component in the signal. To ensure this, the Tektronix A622 AC/DC current probe is connected to a Teledyne LeCroy Waverunner 610 Zi oscilloscope, running at a 25 KS/s sampling rate. According to our preliminary evaluation, this was greatly in excess of the major frequency components, which were expected in the 0-200 Hz range. As there were no difficulties collecting at the higher sampling rate, we did not reduce it.
We are measuring the current delivered by a single phase of the X, Y, and Z axis motors, along with the extruder motor. As we have a single Tektronix A622 AC/DC current probe, we could only collect the data for a single actuator at a time.
To simulate a simultaneous acquisition of power traces for all monitored actuators, we have performed the same experiment (i.e., executed the same print job) multiple times while collecting power traces for a different actuator. This raised the issue of synchronizing the collected power traces. To resolve this, we implemented a trigger signal; we selected the 3D Printer's extruder fan, because it was not one of the actuators under test and could be controlled by the modified G-code. The fan control line was pulled to an external resistor, and set to generate a falling edge immediately before printing the first layer. This triggered the oscilloscope to begin sampling.
Last but not least, we performed the data preprocessing as well as initial visual analytics using Riscure Inspector software [32] .
B. CONDUCTED EXPERIMENTS
For the evaluation of the proposed solution, we follow an approach proposed by Belikovetsky et al. [24] -to test the approach on and identify the detectability threshold for the minimal possible manipulation primitives, i.e., individual G-code commands. Belikovetsky et al. refer to these as atomic modifications, and proposed the following categories of tests: (a) insertion of a new G-code command; (b) deletion of a G-code command present in the original STL file; (c) a reordering of two G-code commands present in the original STL file; (d) replacement of a printing move command with a non-printing move command (''smart void'').
Real manipulations like the injection of voids in the design [10] , [13] , substitution of material [12] , changed printing orientation [11] , [12] , or the amount of extruded filament [17] -will introduce deviations in one or more G-code commands, and will have a larger signature.
We have tested the proposed approach on a simple 10 layer cube with a honeycomb fill; the test cube was 1cm×1cm×0.2cm.
Our attacks were composed of the G-code commands G1, for an extruding movement, and G0, for a non-extruding movement. For the insertion attack, we inserted a G0 command for a rapid linear move in layer 7. For the deletion attack, we deleted a single G1 command in layer 7. For the reordering attack, we swapped two G1 moves in layer 7 and two more in layer 8. For the replacement attack, we replaced a G1 command with the equivalent G0 command in layer 7.
During generation of the master signature, we want to accommodate for possible variations during 3D printing. Therefore, we collected a minimum of 10 traces per channel of the object being printed. As we monitor four channels-X, Y, Z, and extruder motors-and only have a single inductive current probe, we conducted 40 total prints of the same benign object. These measurements established a baseline or ''golden'' measurement for the motors. For each type of atomic modification, we collected 3 traces per channel of the modified print job.
C. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 1) BENIGN PRINTS Figure 6 shows a comparison of the X axis between signature of a master signature and a signature of a benign print. The blue upper line shows the signature of the Z axis, with the spikes corresponding to the transitions between layers. The orange line represents the difference between master signature and the signature of a benign print. The figure shows that the signatures are almost identical, with exception of sporadic anomalies. These can be caused by slight stochastic delays introduced by motors, propagate in the signature generation algorithm.
Our approach takes this into account. To distinguish between stochastic anomalies and attacks, we use a mismatchThreshold. In our experiments, we set this threshold to 15 mismatched windows for the entire layer, or more than three consecutive mismatched windows. The objects used in the experiments had at least 180 sample windows per layer. In the worst case, less than 10% of a signature mismatch for a channel/time-interval PCS t j i is accepted as valid. Table 1 summarizes the results of the performed tests with modified prints. It shows that, in most cases, even a single toolpath command modification could be reliably detected. When only considering channel/time-interval signatures, the detection of layer transition modification was not possible. However, if such a modification impacts the duration of the layer transition, it is detectable when the signatures for the entire prints were compared. The introduction of a smart void, ı.e., replacing an extruding movement with an identical non-extruding movement, could not be detected with the proposed approach. Figure 7 presents the specific example of a comparison between the master and tested signatures, when a single toolpath command was deleted. Figure 7a shows two signatures for the specific channel for a time-interval corresponding to a layer in which the command was deleted. The difference between the two (shown in Figure 7b ) stretches both over three consecutive windows and also significantly affects more than 15 windows. Both are conditions that our algorithm uses to recognize attacks.
2) MODIFIED PRINTS
Based on these results, we can predict the detectability of various real attacks shown in the literature, as summarized in Table 2 .
Insertion of gaps, as shown in Sturm et al. [10] and Belikovetsky et al. [13] , modifies the G-code sequence and will be detected by the proposed algorithm. The same applies to sabotage attacks that scale up or down a printed object along one or more dimensions [16] since it impacts both size and the power consumption patterns.
If the layer thickness is changed for all (or many) layers [33] , this will introduce cumulative delays. The resulting time offset between identical G-code commands in the master and tested signatures can be easily detected by comparing signatures over the entire print period.
Our approach also reliably detects changes in the orientation of printed objects (as discussed in Yampolskiy et al. [11] and Zeltmann et al. [12] ), including the orientation in the Z direction and in the X -Y plane because of significant differences in the G-code command sequences (and resulting motor movements) caused by the change in orientation.
Our detection method relies on synchronization and an accurate 3D printing process; thus, changes to infill patterns, such as those presented in [25] , are noticeable and detected at the first occurrence.
Changes in the extruded filament temperature, as demonstrated by Xiao [16] , might be detectable by monitoring the heating component but were beyond the scope of this paper.
Changes in the amount of filament extruded might not be detected by the proposed algorithm, if the print head motion remains the same.
This issue is closely related to the inability to detect the ''smart void'' atomic modification; it is the major identified limitation of the proposed approach.
VI. DISCUSSION
While the proposed approach has shown impressive results in the tested experimental setup, we see the necessity to discuss the following aspects: (i) limitations of the approach, (ii) its applicability to metal AM systems, and (iii) alternative approach for the generation of a master signature.
A. APPROACH LIMITATIONS
We have identified several limitations of the proposed approach.
Layer transitions on this equipment are usually not long enough to compute a reliable signature with the parameters used. Under current settings, only two or three consecutive windows for each layer transition will be produced. This is insufficient to reliably distinguish between malicious modifications and stochastic anomalies. In our future work we plan to explore an alternative parameters used for signature generation during layer transitions.
The proposed method has not detected brief changes in the extruder data in ''smart void'' attacks that were tested. We believe that larger modifications in the extruder data will be detected and this will be explored in future work. Further, some printing methods use Z-hops, short translations along the Z-axis, after completing a single continuous print move. This printing pattern would be incorrectly identified by our definition of a layer transition.
Our methodology assumes an unmediated relationship between the parameters of the G-code commands and the resulting actuation signal. This is not the case in closed-loop control systems, where the actuator signal is a function of both the input commands and sensor feedback. In such cases, signals in the feedback loop would also need to be captured.
B. APPLICABILITY TO METAL AM SYSTEMS
While the proposed approach has shown good results for FDM technology, this technology is predominantly used with plastics, a source material that has little relevance for safety-critical applications. Two other AM processes are dominating the field of metal additive manufacturing: Powder Bed Fusion (PBF) and Directed Energy Deposition (DED).
In PBF, a thin layer of powder is deposited in a bed and the next layer's profile is melted with a laser or electron beam. Applying the proposed approach to a PBF system will likely require additional instrumentation of heat sources, in order to detect changes in scanning strategies: Selective Laser Sintering/Melting (SLS/SLM) might require a camera and an infrared image recognition system; monitoring Electron Beam Melting (EBM) might utilize EM emanations instead.
DED systems employ a multi-axis arm, through a nozzle mounted on its end melted material is deposited onto a surface, where it solidifies. The source material is in either wire or powder form; it is melted using a laser, electron beam, or plasma arc. The proposed approach may be directly applicable for sabotage attack detection in DED systems if the arm movement and material deposition are controlled by stepper motors. However, additional instrumentation will be needed to measure the energy consumed by the heat source and estimate its impact on the melted material.
C. EMPIRICAL VS. MODEL-BASED GENERATION OF MASTER SIGNATURE
The generation of the master signature as described in this paper is both time-consuming (due to the multitude of measurements necessary) and potentially expensive (due to the non-destructive and destructive testing that is needed to validate the printed 3D part). The expenses increase even more if this approach has to be used on numerous systems, because master signatures should be generated for all systems separately. This raises the question whether alternatives exist, and to what extend they can be viable.
A possible alternative approach could be a 3D model-based generation of a signature. Specifically, if the power consumption for all used tool path commands is known, these can be used to synthesize a master signature.
There are several drawbacks to this approach. First, power consumption models may deviate from a physical system. This might be due to simplifications and errors in the model, variations between supposedly identical components, and the ''aging'' of components due to mechanical or thermal stress. The introduction of an ''envelope'' over a predicted model (or wider thresholds for similarity) can accommodate for this problem, at the cost of reduced attack detectability.
Model-based signature generation must also directly operate from the blueprint or toolpath file, which breaches the air gap between host/printing system and monitoring system. The transfer of model files opens an attack surface on the monitoring system that a malicious actor could use to compromise the signature, similar to the attack of Slaughter et al. [21] . If the monitoring system's only contact with the host is through the side-channel measurement of current, the air gap is preserved.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Additive Manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D Printing, is increasingly being adopted around the world and used to produce functional parts of safety-critical systems. Because of AM's dependence on computerization, there is a growing concern that the AM process can be tampered with, in order to sabotage a part's mechanical properties. To address this threat, we proposed a novel approach for detecting sabotage attacks in manufacturing systems. Our approach is based on the continuous monitoring of current supplied to each individual actuator during the manufacturing process and detecting anomalies compared to a provably benign process.
The proposed approach has numerous advantages: (i) it is non-invasive in a time-critical process (ii) it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and (iii) it can be air-gapped from the computerized components involved in AM process, increasing the difficulty of a simultaneous compromise. We have evaluated the proposed approach on a desktop 3D Printer employing Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM) technology. We monitored the driving current to four motors: the X/Y/Zaxis motors, and the filament extrusion motor. Our results show that the insertion, deletion, and reordering of individual G-code movement commands can be detected with 100% precision through the X and Y motors. Modifications of Z movements, especially when aggregated over multiple layers, can also be detected. Modifications to extrusion rate are visible on an extruder motor current trace, but not detectable with the current method.
This method can detect sabotage attacks implemented with these modifications, which includes many of the void-insertion attacks discussed in the literature and any attacks relying on modifications to a 3D model file.
In our future work, we plan to overcome the identified limitations, including the restriction to open-loop AM systems, and accounting for the gradual accumulation of deviations. We will also test the method against other FDM printers, and adapt it for other printing technologies, such as Powder Bed Fusion and Directed Energy Deposition. The demonstrated anomaly detection performance and the potential applicability to metal AM systems makes the proposed approach an important milestone to ensure AM security in safety-critical systems.
